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Abstract
The current research explores the role of financial sector development on the
control of corruption in a global sample of 140 countries. Using annual data from
1996 to 2015, this study makes use of system generalized method of moments tech-
nique to identify the determinants of corruption across the full sample, low and
lower middle-income countries and, upper middle and high-income countries.
Our empirical findings show that financial development plays an important role
in controlling the growth of corruption across the full sample, low and lower
middle-income countries and upper middle and high-income countries. Simi-
larly, per capita income has a significant positive impact on control of corruption
in upper middle and high-income countries, while education plays a similar role
in low and lower middle-income countries. On the contrary, the per capita
income, trade openness, government expenditure, political rights and civil liberty
are the major factors, which promote the growth of corruption in low and lower
middle-income countries, whereas trade and civil liberty play the same role in
high-income countries. Given these findings, our study makes number policy rec-
ommendations and adds new knowledge to the empirical literature.
KEYWORD S
corruption, education, financial development, government expenditure, political rights, trade
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Corruption is a serious issue in both the developed and
developing economies around the world as it can signifi-
cantly affect economic prosperity, development and
social stability of any given country. A number of
researchers and institutions have defined corruption in
many ways. For instance, Rose-Ackerman defines
corruption as “an illegal payment to a public agent to
obtain a benefit that may or may not be deserved in the
absence of payoffs,” while the World Bank defines it as
“the abuse of public office for private gain.” All of these
definitions mainly imply the misuse of power for per-
sonal gain.
In any given country, a well-functioning banking sys-
tem plays an important role in mobilising savings into
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productive capital. This ensures efficient capital alloca-
tion among the best productive activities and makes a
platform for economic prosperity and development
(Levine, 1997, 2005). However, this may not be the case
always. For instance, corruption in credit lending not
only reduces the efficiency in capital allocation but may
also divert capital from most productive to the
unproductive activities. Charumilind, Kali, and
Wiwattanakantang (2006) and Laeven (2001) document
that the firms that have connections with the banks may
have easier access to the capital than the firms that do
not have such ties. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and
Zamarripa (2003) come up with another view that the
banks that offer loans to the related parties may suffer
from higher default rates than the loans that were
granted to the unrelated ones. Overall, these arguments
imply that lending corruption can have serious implica-
tions on the banking system; more specifically, it reduces
the efficient capital allocation process, decreasing firm
growth and economic development.
Some researchers explore the effect of banking credit
on the level of corruption. For instance, Altunbas¸ and
Thornton (2012) establish that the banking credit to the
private sector plays an important role in fighting the
growth of corruption. Authors attribute this finding to
the fact that the financial institutions or creditors closely
monitor borrowers' activities and hence potentially
reduces their level of corruption. Similarly, Barry, Lepetit,
and Strobel (2016) investigate the role of bank ownership
on bank lending corruption by accounting other determi-
nants in the model such as regulatory environment and
the level of economic development. The findings indicate
that lending corruption is significantly higher in circum-
stances where a higher proportion of credit comes from
the state-owned or family-owned banks. This finding is
consistent across the developed and developing
economies.
Similarly, a number of other studies (Dinç, 2005;
Khwaja & Mian, 2005; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, &
Shleifer, 2002; Sapienza, 2006) argue that the banks that
are owned-and-controlled by the state are more prone to
the lending corruption. Further, these authors, among
others, argue that the state-owned banks finance more to
the politically desired projects than the others; hence,
these banks contribute more to the politicians' welfare
than the social welfare. Another study by Houston, Lin,
and Ma (2011) empirically establishes that lending cor-
ruption is significantly higher in the banks that are
owned by the state. Likewise, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and
Levine (2006) explore the effect of different banking
supervisory policies on lending corruption. Their findings
show that the traditional style of bank supervision has no
significant impact on the banks' lending integrity.
However, increasing private monitoring of banks can
potentially reduce lending corruption, where legal insti-
tutions also occupy an important role in the process. In
the later period, Barth, Lin, Lin, and Song (2009) report
two important factors, which contribute to reducing lend-
ing corruption, which are competition in the banking
sector and sharing information via credit bureaus.
Much of the related literature on the drivers of cor-
ruption has focused on factors such as government
expenditure, investment and economic growth (Del
Monte & Papagni, 2007), bureaucracy (Sharma &
Mitra, 2015), legal system (Treisman, 2000), political fac-
tors (Lederman, Loayza, & Soares, 2005), social organisa-
tion (Coleman, 1990), regulatory system (Svensson, 2005)
and tax system (Mitra & Sharma, 2016). On the other
side, impact of financial sector development on economic
growth, investment and development are well docu-
mented in the theoretical and empirical literature (see,
Ang, 2008; Levine, 2005). However, there is no much lit-
erature that attempts to explore the role of financial sec-
tor development as a controlling factor of corruption.
Theoretically, there could be some important channels,
which potentially connect these two factors. For instance,
the most important channel is financial sector, which
enhances the level of competition in the market that, in
turn, controls corruption (Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales,
2009). Specifically, a better and efficient financial sector
promotes entrepreneurship and encourages new players
in the industry that intensifies competition in the market.
Moreover, it is well documented that corruption is lower
in countries where firms face greater competition (Ades
& Di Tella, 1999; Sharma & Mitra, 2015). In addition, the
efficient financial sector through better participation of
private and foreign banks in a liberal but well-regulated
financial market can control corruption by enhancing the
competition among banks and reducing the credit cost.
It, therefore, implies that the effect of financial sector
development in controlling corruption is somewhat
unfairly ignored in the literature.
Given this backdrop, in the current research, we
explore the effect of financial development on control of
corruption in a global sample of 140 countries. While
doing so, we make some significant contributions to the
literature. First, we use comprehensive data for analyses.
Our sample covers almost all major countries of the
world for a long time horizon: 1996–2015. The considered
sample countries are in different stages of development
and the inter-linkage between corruption and financial
sector development may also differ across these econo-
mies. Therefore, along with the overall sample, we also
test their relationship for low – and lower middle-income
countries and, upper middle – and high-income coun-
tries. Furthermore, for the financial sector development,
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we consider the domestic credit to the private sector by
the banks. Second, the related theoretical and empirical
literature indicate that several other factors such as eco-
nomic, political, government, natural resources, and edu-
cation also play an important role in determining the
level of corruption. Therefore, we use a range of control
variables to capture these aspects, which not only control
our empirical models but also provide information
regarding their effect on corruption. Third, the related lit-
erature suggests that the relationship between corruption
and financial sector development is endogenous in
nature. Therefore, we use the system generalized method
of moments (GMM) technique as it helps to address the
issue of endogeneity in the model. Fourth, the literature
has examined the role of financial sector development on
economic growth, inequality and several other issues;
however, its effect on corruption is widely ignored. In
fact, barring Altunbas¸ and Thornton (2012), to the best of
our knowledge no other study has attempted to explore
the effect of financial sector development on corruption.
Finally, we make a considerable contribution to the pol-
icy and practise by identifying the role of financial devel-
opment in control of corruption across the panels.
The findings show that financial development plays
an important role in reducing the growth of corruption
across the panels (full sample, low- and lower middle-
income countries, and to some extent in upper middle-
and high-income countries). Further, results reveal that
per capita income has a significant positive impact on
control of corruption, while trade openness and civil lib-
erty played the opposite role in upper middle- and high-
income countries. On the other hand, education is only
the other factor, which promoted the control of corrup-
tion in low- and lower middle-income countries, whereas
per capita income, trade openness, government expendi-
ture, political rights and civil liberty seem to provide
more opportunities for rent-seeking, where institutions
are comparatively weak.
The organisation of the paper goes as follows: the
next section provides a brief literature review on the
dynamic association among the corruption, economic
development, banking system, and institutional setup.
Section 3 reports a description of the data, and empirical
methodology. Section 4 presents empirical findings and
detailed discussion. Section 5 reports important policy
implications. The conclusion and summary of the find-
ings are discussed in the final section.
2 | LITERATURE REVIEW
Much of the previous literature focused on the nexus
between corruption and economic growth. There are two
strands of literature in regards to corruption and eco-
nomic development. One stream of researchers believe
that a higher level of corruption leads to a lower level of
economic development. The second stream of researchers
thinks that corruption fastens economic development.
However, both of these arguments are true to some
extent. Thus, it mainly depends on the purpose of corrup-
tion and the channels through which it affects economic
growth. Most economists generally view corruption has a
significant obstacle for economic development
(Mauro, 1995; Murphy, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1993). A num-
ber of previous studies (e.g., Gyimah-Brempong, 2002;
Keefer & Knack, 1997; Sachs & Warner, 1997) empirically
establish that corruption has a considerable negative
effect on economic growth.
In contradiction to that, Wedeman (2002) documents
that East Asian countries such as China, Indonesia,
South Korea, and Thailand have held up with significant
levels of corruption but still all of these countries could
enjoy with substantial growth in per capita incomes. This
evidence indicates that a high level of corruption not nec-
essarily hinders economic growth or per capita income.
Leff (1964) and Lui (1985) also come up with an argu-
ment that corruption may promote economic develop-
ment on some occasions. Other economists ask the
question of the channels through which corruption
affects growth (Mauro, 1995; Mo, 2001; Murphy
et al., 1993; Park, 2012; Tanzi & Davoodi, 1998;
Wei, 2000). Several channels are identified such as reduc-
ing investment rates (Mauro, 1995; Neeman, Paserman,
& Simhon, 2008), adversely effecting foreign investment
inflows (Wei, 2000), making obstacles for business estab-
lishment (World Bank, 2002) and misplacing government
resources (Tanzi & Davoodi, 1998).
The findings of Tanzi and Davoodi (1998),
Mauro (1998) and Gupta, De Mello, and Sharan (2001)
indicate that corruption affects economic growth by alter-
ing the composition of government expenditure from
higher productive activities to the less productive ones.
Some authors explained the association between corrup-
tion, banking, and economic development. For example,
Park (2012) examines the effect of corruption on banking
and economic growth in a panel of 70 developed and
developing economies around the world. The author
makes use of data from 2002 to 2004 and employs various
econometric techniques to achieve the goals of the study.
The author finds a significant positive association
between corruption and non-performing loans to total
loans. Further, the study reports that corruption has a
significant positive impact on non-performing loans,
implying that corruption weakens the quality of bank
loans. The findings of this study also confirm that corrup-
tion reduces economic growth. More specifically, the
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author argues that corruption leads to divert the bank
loans from the good projects to the bad projects, reducing
the quality of funding for the economic activities and
hence lowering economic growth.
On the other side, Ahlin and Pang (2008) document
that a lower level of corruption and higher financial
development work in favour of promoting economic
growth. Some empirical studies also explained the rela-
tionship between corruption and economic growth
through various other channels. Mo (2001) finds that the
most significant channel through which corruption
affects economic growth is political instability. Serra
(2006) empirically examines the determinants of corrup-
tion using a sensitivity analysis approach. More specifi-
cally, the author covers a panel of 62 countries around
the world, which includes developed and developing
economies. The study uses average values on the selected
variables during the study period that is, 1990–1998. The
findings of this study show that democratic institutions
play an important role in reducing corruption levels in
developed economies, while political instability plays the
opposite role; specifically, it contributes to a higher level
of corruption. Freille, Haque, and Kneller (2007) explore
the association between corruption and aggregate press
freedom. Their results are consistent with the theoretical
expectation, that is lower the press freedom higher the
corruption and, vice versa. Further, authors argue that
both economic and political influence on media seems to
be strongly associated with corruption. By accounting for
other potential determinants of corruption, a number of
other researchers (e.g., Ahrend, 2002; Brunetti &
Weder, 2003) also confirm that a lower level of press free-
dom is strongly associated with a higher level of corrup-
tion. Similarly, Chowdhury (2004) suggests that both
democracy and press freedom have considerable influ-
ence on corruption.
The empirical analysis of Lederman et al. (2005) and
Brunetti and Weder (2003) indicate that higher the press
freedom lowers the level of corruption. Neeman
et al. (2008) empirically examine the association between
corruption and economic output by taking into account
of the degree of openness. The results show the evidence
of a strong negative correlation between per capita
income and corruption in countries that have higher
openness. Similar to the above findings, Blackburn and
Forgues-Puccio (2010) document that the negative impact
of corruption on economic development is determined by
the degree to which the economy is opened, higher
(lower) the open economy higher (lower) would be the
impact. On the contrary, Treisman (2000), and Knack
and Azfar (2000) find that openness to the world is
related to less corruption because trade restrictions often
give more discretionary power to bureaucrats that result
into a considerable amount of bribery and rent-seeking
activities.
The other economic, political, institutional and
social factors could potentially cause corruption. For
instance, studies of Treisman (2000), Knack and
Azfar (2000), Lederman et al. (2005), and Serra (2006)
indicate the level or stage of economic development has
an impact on corruption. It is argued that developed
countries are able to devote more resources for the
detection and prevention of corruption, which in turn,
controls the level of corruption. In addition, develop-
ment increases education, skill, and literacy that
enhance the likelihood that an act of corruption is dis-
covered and punished.
Leite and Weidmann (1999) show that the extent of
natural resource abundance is an important cause of cor-
ruption as the resources generate opportunities for rent-
seeking behaviour. Likewise, Fisman and Gatti (2002),
and Elbahnasawy and Revier (2012) document that
higher government expenditure and the public sector
often provide considerable rent-seeking opportunities. It
is simply because if a greater ratio of production is pro-
cured by the government then higher bribes might be
offered to the officials. The analysis of Sharma and
Mitra (2015), Gurgur and Shah (2005), Brunetti and
Weder (2003) suggest that higher quality of bureaucracy
and regulation lead to significantly reduce the probability
of corruption to occur. Damania, Fredriksson, and
Mani (2004), Brunetti and Weder, (2004), and Park (2003)
use the rule of law index that includes several indicators
to measure to what extent the economic agents abide by
the rules of society in their analysis. The findings of these
studies were quite favourable, and indicate that these
aspects play a significant role in determining the level of
corruption in a country.
Overall, our literature survey implies that most of
the previous studies focused on the effect of corruption
on economic development and some studies even fur-
ther investigated to explain the channels through which
corruption affects economic development. One of the
important channels through which corruption affects
economic development is through banking lending.
Again, some empirical findings indicate that banks'
lending corruption may have a positive or negative
impact on economic output. However, the empirical evi-
dence on the role of financial development on corrup-
tion is very limited. Hence, our current research paper
explores the role that financial development plays on
corruption in a global sample of 140 countries and
makes use of the most recent available data set. There-
fore, the findings obtained from this research may offer
significant policy implications and may add new knowl-
edge to the empirical literature.
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3 | EMPIRICAL SETUP:
SPECIFICATION, DATA AND
STYLIZED FACTS
3.1 | Basic model specification
Our baseline empirical model is a mixed model that fol-
lows the specification of Becker (1968) and Ades and Di
Tella (1999). We include several factors that potentially
affect the level of corruption or control of corruption.
These factors come from economic, governance, social
and political arenas. Formally, we estimate the determi-
nants of control on corruption for a panel of countries:
Yit = β1 + β2Xit + β3Zit + eit ð1Þ
where, Y and X represent control on corruption and finan-
cial sector development indicators, respectively. The vari-
able Z is a vector of control variables and e is the error
term. The control of corruption index is used as the depen-
dent variable in the model. The i and t indicate cross-sec-
tion (country) and time period (1996–2015), respectively.
3.2 | Data measurement
In this study, we use annual data from 1996 to 20151 on a
sample of 140 countries across the globe.2 For a better
insight and comparison, we divide the full sample coun-
tries into low- and lower-middle income countries and,
upper-middle and high-income countries according to
the World Bank classification. Using these annual data
series, we construct the panel data sets.
Measurement of corruption is a challenging task
because of its nature. Direct data on corruption or bribery
is not available; nevertheless, a number of perceptions
based indices of corruption or of control of corruption are
available. We mainly utilize the Control of Corruption
(CC) index, which is provided by the International Coun-
try Risk Guide's corruption index (ICRG). Transparency
International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is com-
partively popular in public discussion; however, it is not
very appropriate for a panel data of countries analysis
mainly because the CPI computation methodology chan-
ged in 2012; therefore, before and after computed data
are not directly comparable (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mas-
truzzi, 2011; Treisman, 2007). The control of corruption
index of ICRG is developed based on the idea of “high
government officials likely to demand special payments”
and “illegal payments generally expected throughout
lower levels of government” in the form of “bribes con-
nected with import and export licences, exchange rate
controls, tax assessment, police protection, or loans”
(Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997). In this study, the corruption
perception index of the ICRG has been used for mainly
two reasons. First, the series covers a long time-horizon
as well as a large number of countries. Further, the com-
prehensive nature of the index is could be advantageous
for analysis such as one in hand over other available indi-
ces for corruption. Second, the index shares a high degree
of correlated with other available corruption indices (see
Treisman, 2000).
It is important to identify the theoretical and empiri-
cal support for the selection of the relevant variables that
affect the control of corruption. Therefore, we build our
empirical model by making use of those theoretical and
empirical studies. By following Levine et al. (2000), Beck
et al. (2000), and Altunbas¸ and Thornton (2012), we
proxy financial development with domestic credit to the
private sector by the banks as a percentage of GDP
(DCPvtB). Likewise, we undertake a range of control var-
iables in our empirical analyses. Our variables cover dif-
ferent aspects such as economic, political, government
and education areas, which potentially have some degree
of impact on the level of corruption. Specifically, the
income is proxied with GDP per capita (LYCAP) (e.g.,
Damania et al., 2004; Kunicova & Rose-Ackerman, 2005;
Lederman et al., 2005), natural resources proxied by total
natural resources rent value as a percentage of GDP
(RESOURCE) (e.g., Leite & Weidmann, 1999), trade
openness is proxied by the total exports and imports as a
percentage of GDP (TRADE) (e.g., Gurgur & Shah, 2005),
size of the government proxied by general government
final consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP
(GOVEXP) (e.g., Fisman and Gatti (2002). Likewise, we
also account for civil liberties (CL), press freedom (PF)
and political rights (PR) (e.g., Graeff & Mehlkop, 2003;
Gurgur & Shah, 2005) and, finally education is proxied
with secondary school enrolment rate (percentage)
(NETENROL) (e.g., Brunetti & Weder, 2003; Persson &
Tabellini, 2003; Rauch & Evans, 2000). We provide a
detailed description and sources of data on the consid-
ered variables in Table 1.3
In Figures 1–3, we present scatter plots to illustrate
the bivariate relationships between control of corruption
and financial sector development. The figures show, for
all of the considered countries, the regression line fits
quite well and there is a clear positive relationship
between them (see Figure 1). While, in case of low and
lower middle-income countries (Figure 2), and upper
middle and high income countries (Figure 3), although
the regression lines show a positive effect, yet, the lines
do not fit very well as suggested by R2 statistics. This
analysis is simple but tells us about the fundamental posi-
tive relationship between these variables. Recognizing
the complication in the relationship between corruption
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and financial sector development, the next section
explores the linkage in a more comprehensive way.
3.3 | Estimation technique
The previous research documented that corruption can
cause financial sector development and economic
growth. It, therefore, implies the presence of endogeneity
and reverse causality in the model that we presented in
Equation (1). Given that fact, the conventional methodol-
ogy such as the fixed effects method does not resolve the
potential endogeneity problem of the important explana-
tory variables of the model, such as financial sector devel-
opment and economic growth. Hence, we employ the
system GMM method on the country panel which con-
trols for unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity bias
TABLE 1 Data description
Name Definition Source
CC Control of corruption ICRG
DCPvtB Domestic credit to private
sector by banks % of GDP
WDI, 2016
LYCAP Log of GDP per capita
(constant 2010 US$)
WDI, 2016
TRADE Trade as a share of GDP, in % WDI, 2016
GOVEXP General government final
consumption expenditure
(% of GDP)
WDI, 2016
RESOURCE Total natural resources rent %
of GDP
WDI, 2016
NETENROL Net secondary school
enrolment rate (%)
WDI, 2016
PR Political rights (1 = most free
and 7 = least free)
Freedom house
PF Press freedom (not free = 0;
partly free = 1; free = 2)
Freedom house
CL Civil liberties (1 = most free
and 7 = least free)
Freedom house
FIGURE 1 Control on corruption and financial sector
development for full sample. Note: Average value of indicators of
the period 1996–2015 used in the scatter diagram. Source of control
on corruption (CC) data is from ICRG. Source: Authors' calculation
based on data described in data section [Colour figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
FIGURE 2 Control on corruption and financial sector
development for low and lower middle income sample. Note:
Average value of indicators of the period 1996–2015 used in the
scatter diagram. Source of control on corruption (CC) data is from
ICRG. Source: Authors' calculation based on data described in data
section [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
FIGURE 3 Control on corruption and financial sector
development for high income and upper middle income sample.
Note: Average value of indicators of the period 1996–2015 used in
the scatter diagram. Source of control on corruption (CC) data is
from ICRG. Source: Authors' calculation based on data described in
data section [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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in the data. The GMM methodology, which involves tak-
ing first differences to eliminate country-specific effects
and instrumenting these with lagged levels to control for
simultaneity bias has not yielded satisfactory results in
reducing bias in parameter estimates (Blundell and Bond,
2000). Blundell and Bond (2000) show that imposing
more informative moment conditions that are valid
under reasonable restrictions of stationarity on the initial
conditions process yield a better result in controlling the
simultaneity bias. This augmented GMM-model is popu-
larly called system GMM. Essentially, system GMM
involves the use of lagged first-differences as instruments
for equations in first differences, in addition to employing
lagged-levels as instruments for equations at level; this
dramatically improves the efficiency (Arellano and Bover,
1995). Blundell and Bond (2000) confirm that lagged
first-differences are more informative instruments for
levels and produce more reasonable results than the
GMM (differenced-GMM). While estimating Equation 1
using system GMM, we consider indicators of financial
sector development and per-capita GDP as endogenous
variables.
4 | EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND
DISCUSSION
The main objective of this research paper is to examine
the determinants of corruption across a global sample of
140 countries. Nevertheless, we have a special interest in
knowing the role of financial sector development in con-
trolling corruption. Further, we divide our sample coun-
tries into two sub-samples such as low- and lower
middle-income countries, and upper middle- and high-
income countries. The reason for dividing our sample
countries into these two groups is to see whether the
determinants of corruption change as the nature of eco-
nomic development and institutional set up significantly
varies among these groups of nations. To achieve these
objectives, we employ the system GMM technique. The
empirical findings of this method are presented and dis-
cussed in the following.
The results from the system GMM technique are pres-
ented in Table 2. The results suggest that financial devel-
opment has a positive impact on control of corruption
across the models presented in columns 1 to 5. The level
of economic developed proxied by per capita income is
turned out to be positive and statistically significant in all
models. While, education has a negative impact on con-
trolling corruption in the comprehensive model pres-
ented in column 5 and that is a surprising result, indeed.
As expected, government size, proxied with government
expenditure, is negatively affecting control of corruption
or causing corruption. Surprising results are also found
on coefficients of political rights and civil liberties as both
indices have negative effect on control of corruption, but
later could not pass the statistical significance. The sur-
prising inverse impact of political rights on control on
corruption perhaps indicates that prosecution in corrup-
tion-related cases becomes cumbersome and time taking
process when citizens have high-level political rights.
These results might be due to the significant heterogene-
ity in the selected full sample countries. Therefore, to
address this issue, we again carry this empirical exercise
for low- and lower middle-income countries, and upper
middle- and high-income countries separately and their
detailed results will be discussed.
On the other side, press freedom is shown to have a
supportive factor in controlling corruption. While, open-
ness is found to be negative and statistically significant
throughout, implying that opening of the market perhaps
makes it difficult to control corruption. This may be
because lesser trade restrictions make it easy to cross the
illicit capital to the national boundaries through trade
mispricing (see Nitsch, 2012). As expected, the abun-
dance of natural resources endowment often causes a
higher level of corruption; this tendency is captured by
results regarding natural resources. Given the findings
from the system GMM, we argue that financial develop-
ment, through banking credit to the private sector, plays
an important role in reducing the level of corruption in
our sample countries. While, increasing trade openness,
government spending and political rights seem to be in
favour of raising corruption levels in the sample
countries.
It is a well-known fact that issues of financial devel-
opment and reforms, and corruption are prime concerns
and thus they are core elements of economic policies in
developing economies. Therefore, we specifically estimate
their linkage for low- and lower middle-income countries
and their findings are displayed in Table 3. The system
GMM results suggest that financial development is a
major factor in controlling the level of corruption in low-
and lower middle-income countries. We also find that
education has a significant positive impact on control of
corruption in these countries. However, factors like trade
openness and government spending perhaps increase the
rent-seeking opportunities for government officials in
these economies. Importantly, per capita GDP turns out
to be negative and statistically significant in two out of
four occasions, indicating that in low and lower middle-
income countries an increase in economic growth leads
to a relatively higher level of corruption growth and that
is not very surprising, given the nature of the market and
economic structure. Furthermore, a greater extent of civil
liberty and political rights leading to difficulty in
SHARMA AND PARAMATI 7
controlling corruption.. Given these findings, we argue
that financial development is an important factor, which
plays a major role in reducing the corruption level.
While, raising international trade, through the exports
and imports of goods and services, government spending
on various public welfare activities and increasing politi-
cal rights are giving more opportunities for corruption in
relatively low-income economies.
Undoubtedly, financial sector is well developed and
corruption is low in most of the developed economies.
However, the recent financial crisis and a number of
scandals over corruption have shown that developed
economies also have issues on both accounts. The nations
that are supposed to be free from corruption are also suf-
fering from its effects.4 Therefore, we test the impact sep-
arately for these countries and our goal is to know
whether the effect works differently. Table 4 presents sys-
tem GMM results on upper middle- and high-income
countries. Our results show that the financial sector
development seems to have a positive impact on control
of corruption even in the developed economies. More
specifically, our results suggest that financial develop-
ment is statistically significant in two models out of five.
It is often perceived that financial development and con-
trol of corruption might have passed the threshold level
in higher-income countries; nevertheless, our results pro-
vide some evidence that indicates financial sector devel-
opment still matters for controlling the corruption in
developed countries.
The results across the models (columns 2 to 5) imply
that, as expected, per capita income is found to be a dom-
inant factor in determining the control of corruption,
TABLE 2 Determinants of corruption: Sys GMM estimation (full sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CC CC CC CC CC
L.CC 0.783** 0.747** 0.712** 0.593** 0.559**
(0.0208) (0.0195) (0.0220) (0.0314) (0.0319)
DCPvtB 0.000493** 0.000226** 0.000156 0.000345** 0.000362**
(0.0000810) (0.0000907) (0.000102) (0.000106) (0.000117)
LYCAP 0.0215** 0.0293** 0.0499** 0.0459**
(0.00375) (0.00430) (0.00757) (0.00757)
TRADE −0.0000374 −0.000353** −0.000312**
(0.0000839) (0.000105) (0.000131)
GOVEXP −0.00258** −0.00434** −0.00440**
(0.000893) (0.00123) (0.00129)
RESOURCE −0.00130** −0.00160** −0.000505
(0.000274) (0.000350) (0.000417)
NETENROL −0.000208 −0.000923**
(0.000392) (0.000415)
PR −0.00909*
(0.00525)
PF 0.0196**
(0.00904)
CL −0.00997
(0.00639)
Constant 0.0706** −0.0862** −0.0772** −0.148** −0.0327
(0.00794) (0.0273) (0.0294) (0.0421) (0.0539)
N 1702 1,691 1,503 794 770
Sargan (p-value) .000 .024 .540 .993 .583
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p < .10, **p < .05.
Note: 1. Sargan is Sargan Test of over-identified Restrictions. 2. One step Sys-GMM is used in all models. 3. DCPvtB and LYCAP are consid-
ered endogenous, while all other variables are considered exogenous.
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perhaps indicating that when these economies witness an
economic slump (surge) then corruption moves up
(down). While, natural resource abundance and civil lib-
erty make it difficult to control corruption in upper mid-
dle- and high-income countries. The evidence on the
remaining variables seem to be statistically insignificant.
Since our results on political rights, civil liberty, and
press freedom are a bit surprising. This could be due to
multicollinearity between them. To avoid this issue, we
separately keep them in control of corruption models and
present results of estimations in Table 5. The results of
PR, PF and CL do not change much from our previous
estimates. Specifically, it is suggested that civil rights
have an inverse impact on the control of corruption in all
three sets of countries. Political rights has a negative coef-
ficient in the overall sample as well in developing
countries' samples. Press freedom is found to have a posi-
tive and significant impact on corruption control in all
sets except in the developed countries set (not statistically
significant, though). The results of other variables do not
vary at a noticeable level. Thus, these results further vali-
date that in certain conditions a higher level of political
and civil rights can make controlling corruption
cumbersome.
5 | POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Our empirical results from low- and lower middle-
income countries indicated that financial development
has a significant positive impact on control of corruption.
For the sake of comparison from existing literature, the
TABLE 3 Determinants of corruption: Sys GMM estimator (low and lower middle income countries)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CC CC CC CC CC
L.CC 0.693** 0.700** 0.680** 0.638** 0.589**
(0.0245) (0.0215) (0.0242) (0.0325) (0.0332)
DCPvtB 0.000283* 0.000512** 0.000312 0.00112** 0.00117**
(0.000149) (0.000161) (0.000195) (0.000266) (0.000262)
LYCAP −0.00484 0.00793 −0.0199* −0.0190*
(0.00546) (0.00617) (0.0102) (0.0100)
TRADE 0.0000760 −0.000532** −0.000559**
(0.000113) (0.000177) (0.000174)
GOVEXP −0.00439** −0.00754** −0.00723**
(0.000955) (0.00121) (0.00119)
RESOURCE −0.00103** −0.000486 0.000447
(0.000298) (0.000346) (0.000371)
NETENROL 0.00112** 0.000787**
(0.000377) (0.000376)
PR −0.0142**
(0.00447)
PF 0.00929
(0.00887)
CL −0.0128**
(0.00623)
Constant 0.0947** 0.123** 0.106** 0.325** 0.425**
(0.00900) (0.0405) (0.0441) (0.0668) (0.0745)
N 1,090 1,079 938 425 425
Sargan test of overid. Restrictions 0.001 0.052 0.040 0.221 0.401
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p < .10, **p < .05.
Note: 1. Sargan is Sargan Test of over-identified Restrictions. 2. One step Sys-GMM is used in all models. 3. DCPvtB and LYCAP are consid-
ered endogenous, while all other variables are considered exogenous.
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study of Altunbas¸ and Thornton (2012) comes close to
our attempt. However, our coverage of countries and data
significantly differs from that of Altunbas¸ and Thorn-
ton (2012). Specifically, we have more sample countries
as we make use of the latest available data, and classify
sample countries into two groups based on the nature of
economic development. Nevertheless, our main results
still validate the findings of Altunbas¸ and Thornton.
Based on the finding, we argue that financial develop-
ment is effectively working in favour of reducing the level
of corruption across the low- and lower middle-income
countries. More specifically, we attribute this finding to
the fact that the financial institutions such as banks
might be closely monitoring borrowers' activities and
hence effectively reducing the growth of corruption level.
Similarly, we also find that the growth in financial
development promotes the control of corruption in upper
middle- and high-income countries. However, financial
development is significant only in two models out of five.
These findings, overall, imply that financial development
plays an essential role in reducing the corruption growth
across the countries. Given these arguments, we suggest
that the policymakers should aim to further strengthen
the financial institutions, particularly in low- and lower
middle-income countries, which will play a significant
role in minimising the corruption level.
Similarly, our results from the low- and lower middle-
income countries suggested that education plays a pivotal
role in fighting the growth of corruption in these econo-
mies. In contrast, evidence indicated that the growth in
per capita income, trade openness, government expendi-
ture, political rights and civil liberty are the major factors,
TABLE 4 Determinants of corruption: Sys GMM estimation (upper middle and high income countries)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CC CC CC CC CC
L.CC 0.713** 0.744** 0.699** 0.627** 0.639**
(0.0317) (0.0283) (0.0326) (0.0422) (0.0433)
DCPvtB 0.000225** 0.000122 0.0000658 0.000112 0.000205*
(0.0000871) (0.0000855) (0.0000939) (0.000101) (0.000120)
LYCAP 0.0444** 0.0572** 0.0627** 0.0466**
(0.0105) (0.0113) (0.0142) (0.0155)
TRADE 0.0000680 −0.000101 −0.000236*
(0.0000825) (0.0000991) (0.000124)
GOVEXP 0.000156 0.000599 0.00105
(0.00131) (0.00173) (0.00194)
RESOURCE −0.00101** −0.000682 −0.0000113
(0.000375) (0.000502) (0.000762)
NETENROL 0.000626 0.00145
(0.000889) (0.00109)
PR 0.0147
(0.0127)
PF −0.00592
(0.0129)
CL −0.0258**
(0.0103)
Constant 0.160** −0.307** −0.408** −0.476** −0.373**
(0.0191) (0.0998) (0.106) (0.144) (0.165)
N 612 612 565 369 345
Sargan test of overid. Restrictions 0.000 0.061 0.022 0.228 0.362
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p < .10, **p < .05.
Note: 1. Sargan is Sargan Test of over-identified Restrictions. 2. One step Sys-GMM is used in all models. 3. DCPvtB and LYCAP are consid-
ered endogenous, while all other variables are considered exogenous.
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which are obstacles in controlling corruption in low- and
lower middle-income countries. It implies that the expan-
sion of economic growth, in terms of increasing per
capita income, provides more rent-seeking opportunities
for government officials in low-income economies. Fur-
ther, we argue that the firms that are involved in interna-
tional trade for exports and imports of goods and services
might be making illegal payments to the concern officials
to get quick approvals for their international trade activi-
ties. Therefore, the growth in trade openness might be
adversely affecting control of corruption. Similarly,
increasing government spending on various public wel-
fare schemes might also becoming a platform for corrup-
tion activities for many bureaucrats and other mediators.
This might be true in many developing countries as most
of these countries are trapped with low-level of educa-
tion, lack of transparency in decision-making and have
less awareness of the public welfare policies. Hence, there
is a significant scope for the bureaucrats to misuse their
power for their personal gain. Consequently, a higher
level of government spending in low- and lower middle-
income countries seems to lead to a higher-level of cor-
ruption. Thus, this is supporting the argument of Tanzi
(1994) that the larger the state and the greater the extent
of state intervention in the economy, the greater will be
the rent-seeking options available. In addition to those, a
higher-level of political rights and civil liberty in the
developing countries leading to an obstacle in controlling
corruption. This could be because a higher-level of politi-
cal and civil rights provides the time for reputations to
build and relationships to form across the public-private
border in which briber givers and takers can have confi-
dence. Thus, while increasing the potential loss if bureau-
crats are fired, rights might delay the process and
actually increase the expected returns to corruption. This
is especially true when the institutions, such as legal sys-
tems are inefficient and overburdened (for a detailed dis-
cussion, see Treisman, 2000). Our results also show that a
high level of trade leading to difficulty in controlling the
corruption, this could be because of more international
trade provides an easy way to transfer illicit capital
aboard (see Neeman et al., 2008).
Further, our findings indicated that the growth in per
capita income played an important role in controlling the
corruption level in upper middle- and high-income coun-
tries. Based on this finding, we argue that rising per capita
income, or economic growth, levels of individuals might
be discouraging them to involve in corruption activities;
hence, it has an adverse effect. Our findings further
showed that the growth in trade openness, resource
renting and civil liberty work in favour of promoting cor-
ruption activities in high-income economies. Given these
pieces of evidence, we suggest the policymakers and
government officials of the upper middle- and high-
income countries should realize the potentiality of the
higher per capita income or higher economic growth in
fighting the growth of corruption. Similarly, the
policymakers also should be aware of the fact that the
growth in trade openness, resource renting and civil lib-
erty is working against the spirit of control on corruption.
Therefore, the policymakers should initiate appropriate
and transparent policies in regards to international trade
activities and resources renting. These policies may assist
those economies to minimize the growth of corruption.
Our results regarding government expenditure sup-
port the findings of Treisman's (2000), who found that
greater state intervention in the economy is significantly
associated with higher corruption. It was argued that the
greater the presence of the state, quantified by govern-
ment expenditure or other indicators, higher is the proba-
bility of corruption. The high intervention through
government expenditure and regulatory environment
encourages corruption because in such cases profitability
is more driven by government policies and discretionary
power of the officials rather than by management or
entrepreneurial skills (Acemoglu, Ticchi, &
Vindigni, 2011). This phenomenon is likely to occur in
developing economies that have confirmed by our results.
Our results on resources leading corruption are
supporting the argument of natural resource riches breed
corruption, which, in turn, lower economic performance
(e.g., Leite and Weidmann, 2002, Sala-i-Martin & Sub-
ramanian, 2013, and Sharma & Mitra, 2019).
The results in regards to political rights and civil lib-
erty are suggesting that these factors promote corruption
in some contexts. Similar findings were found by earlier
studies, for example, Rock (2009). It was argued that
there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between
democracy, civil liberty and corruption. Given these dis-
cussions, the policymakers and government officials
should realize that the political and administrative pow-
ers by the politicians and bureaucrats are often misused
for personal gains that in turn promote corruption and
nepotism. Therefore, the policymakers should make sure
that political and civil rights can not be misused for
higher rent-seeking. Therefore, it is of utmost importance
to have institutional efficiency along with political and
civil rights. Our findings imply in such a way, developing
and developed economies can minimize the incidents of
corruption.
6 | CONCLUSION
There is a growing interest among the policymakers, aca-
demic community and government officials on the
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factors, which affect the corruption level across the devel-
oped and developing economies. It is mainly because cor-
ruption affects all walks of life in society. More
specifically, corruption can affect economic development,
prosperity, political and social stability, and social tur-
moil in any given country. Therefore, recent research has
started to pay considerable attention to identify the fac-
tors that drive the level of corruption. Some authors (e.g.,
Altunbas¸ & Thornton, 2012) documented that a well-
functioning financial system can help to reduce the
growth of corruption. However, it is not yet clear whether
the growth in financial development has a negative
impact on corruption or not across the developed and
developing economies.
Given this background, our study has explored the
role of financial sector development (proxied by banking
credit to the private sector) on the control of corruption
in a global sample of 140 countries. Further, to under-
stand its dynamic impact across the developed and devel-
oping economies, we divided our sample countries into
low - and lower middle-income countries and, upper
middle – and high-income countries. For the empirical
investigation, we employed the system GMM technique
and used annual data from 1996 to 2015.
Our empirical findings established that financial
development played an important role in reducing the
growth of corruption in full sample, low- and lower mid-
dle-income countries, and to some extent in upper mid-
dle- and high-income countries. Further, our empirical
findings have shown that per capita income has a signifi-
cant positive impact on control of corruption, while trade
openness and civil liberty played the opposite role in
upper middle- and high-income countries. On the other
hand, education is only the other factor, which promoted
the control of corruption in low- and lower middle-
income countries, whereas per capita income, trade open-
ness, government expenditure, political rights and civil
liberty seemed to provide more opportunities for rent-
seeking, where institutions are comparatively weak.
Overall, these results suggested that financial devel-
opment played an essential role in reducing the growth
of corruption across low-income and high-income coun-
tries. However, the low-income countries are more
exposed to corruption through the expansion of economic
growth, trade activities and government expenditure,
while developed economies, it is the trade openness that
provides more the rent-seeking opportunity and corrup-
tion. Given these findings, our study offered a number of
policy recommendations and adds new knowledge to the
body of the empirical literature.
While concluding, it is essential to highlight some
limitations of this study. One important limitation of this
study is a limited period of the data for the analyses due
to the unavailability of corruption series for a longer
period. Another limitation of this study is not providing
evidence on the effect of sub-sectors of the financial sec-
tor, such as banking, stock markets and bond markets on
corruption. Future studies may consider these issues in
their research.
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ENDNOTES
1 The sample period is relatively small and it is due to the availabil-
ity of data. Therefore, this can be considered as a limitation of the
study.
2 The list of selected countries for the analyses is displayed in
Appendix A.
3 The readers can see the descriptive statistics and cross-correla-
tions of these variables in Appendix B and Appendix C,
respectively.
4 For example, even in cleanest countries like Norway and Sweden,
state owned companies have shown to be taking bribe. Former
Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his Christian Democratic party, the
CDU, were established to be engaged in malpractices and they
were penalized for receiving illegal campaign funding. In finan-
cial sector too, several developed nations have witnessed a mild to
deep crisis in the recent years including the American financial
crisis of 2008–2009.
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APPENDIX: LIST OF 140 COUNTRIES
MONITORED BY INTERNATIONAL COUNTRY
RISK GUIDE (ICRG)
APPENDIX: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Albania
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Belarus
Belgium
Bolivia
Botswana
brazil
Brunei
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Cameroon
Canada
Chile
china
Colombia
Congo
Congo, DR
costa Rica
Côte d'Ivoire
Croatia
Cuba
Cyprus
Czech republic
Denmark
Dominican republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Estonia
Ethiopia
Finland
France
Gabon
Gambia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
guinea
guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hong Kong
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Korea, DPR
Korea, south
Kuwait
Latvia
Lebanon
Liberia
Libya
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Malta
Mexico
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Namibia
Netherlands
new Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
panama
Papua new guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Romania
Russia
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Serbia
sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
Somalia
south Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Suriname
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Taiwan
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Trinidad & Tobago
Tunisia
turkey
UAE
Uganda
Ukraine
united kingdom
united states
Uruguay
Venezuela
Vietnam
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
CC 2,352 0.45 0.20 0.00 1.00
DCPvtB 3,472 44.16 39.70 0.15 312.15
YCAP 3,770 12,501.29 18,285.44 122.49 145,221.20
TRADE 3,617 90.15 53.01 0.03 531.74
GOVEXP 3,455 16.40 8.26 2.05 156.53
RESOURCE 3,342 10.13 14.77 0.00 92.02
NETENROL 1,622 68.84 25.28 2.68 100.00
PR 3,812 3.39 2.18 1.00 7.00
PF 3,774 1.02 0.83 0.00 2.00
CL 3,812 3.35 1.85 1.00 7.00
16 SHARMA AND PARAMATI
APPENDIX: CROSS-CORRELATION
CC DCPvtB LYCAP TRADE GOVEXP RESOURCE NETENROL PR PF CL
CC 1
DCPvtB 0.52 1
LYCAP 0.70 0.65 1
TRADE 0.16 0.28 0.23 1
GOVEXP 0.41 0.33 0.54 0.11 1
RESOURCE −0.24 −0.28 −0.22 −0.05 −0.25 1
NETENROL 0.49 0.50 0.81 0.11 0.52 −0.16 1
PR −0.54 −0.36 −0.53 −0.06 −0.40 0.57 −0.44 1
PF 0.59 0.40 0.55 0.07 0.48 −0.50 0.42 −0.82 1
CL −0.61 −0.46 −0.62 −0.13 −0.46 0.57 −0.51 0.90 −0.83 1
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